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52 years of continuous armed conflict, which left more than 200.000 deaths and took 6 million people out of their homes, ended on November 24, 2016.  

It should be, one might think, a reason of pride and ecstasy in a third-world country which suffered and cried over those dead bodies.

Weirdly, and, of course, unfortunately, it is not.

The president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos announced in September 2012 his government had been secretly exploring negotiations with FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People's Army) the longest-living armed group of the Americas. This took the people, and Santos’ opponents, by surprise, and triggered a dormant feeling which was nevertheless very present in Colombian politics then: A visceral hatred of guerrilla armies and, with same fierce, of socialist and communist ideas. Ex-president Alvaro Uribe, who governed the country for 8 years prior Santos, was the one who exposed the secret meetings via Twitter. This instantly made him the speaker of those who would oppose the peace talks.

A long-time enemy of FARC, Uribe paved his way to use the social discontent towards the talks as a political platform.
And Colombians’ disdain towards a peace process could have been paved previously. In 2002, then-president Andres Pastrana (another scathing critic of the current talks) stopped a 3 year-process due to proven violations of human rights perpetrated by the guerrillas. These crimes, widely broadcasted and publicized, infuriated a population who saw how those broken promises played fool on them.  

During Uribe’s term (2002-2010), his rhetoric of fighting the guerillas fiercely no matter how many human rights were to be violated, easily entered collective conscious. By the end of his regime, Uribe’s popularity was the highest in the history of the nation.

No wonder, hence, that more than 60% of people claimed they opposed the process once it started.
However, as the details of the process were released and the process was blanketed by openness, Colombians’ opinion started to drift toward acceptance. The financial and business-based advantages of a peace scenario convinced an elite which was always afraid of communism, but had been historically affected by the lack of foreign investment. That very issue, the foreign investment that, according to Santos, had been frightened by the armed conflict, was his hobbyhorse for the high classes. As for the lower ones, his message was simple: You will die no more due to bombs, armed confrontation or blackmail (they will die of other, more pervading causes, though: poverty, a sickening healthcare system, intolerance…).  By the beginning of 2016, most polls showed an approval of 70% towards the process, mainly in rural areas.

Those rural areas, obviously, have been the historical victims of this ceaseless conflict.

A widely – promoted referendum took place On October 2, 2016 to inquire the nation about their approval on the final document signed La Havana, Cuba, the city which hosted the entire negotiations. The intervention of foreign institutions (European Union, United Nations, the Vatican, all had expressed in favor of the process), an outstanding support in social media, a perceived approval in traditional media (newspaper polls showed a unequivocal majority for those who would vote YES, that is, the people who approve what was signed), and a alleged “fatigue” towards the war, all were factors which mislead public opinion and made many believe the answer was already known.
The results were 50.2% against, 49.8% in favor.

While I am writing this text, Santos and his members of government and breaking their heads trying to find out how to take the process out of this dead-end.  Right now, what is perceived outside as a reason to feel proud and expectant, is now the reason to worry and wonder: How can peace make a nation fight?

Juan Merchán
October 2016